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Controversy has surrounded the United States’ deten-tion and treatment of nearly two hundred allegedmembers of the Taliban and al-Qaeda at the U.S.
naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At issue is the scope
of applicability of the Geneva Conventions, a series of treaties
that provide international humanitarian legal standards for
states parties during armed conflicts. In particular, the Third
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War and the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War extend a variety
of procedural and sub-
stantive legal rights to
prisoners of war and
other victims of armed
conflicts. As states parties
to the Conventions, both
the United States and
Afghanistan are legally
bound to afford the pro-
tections guaranteed in
the treaties to prisoners
detained as a result of the
present conflict between
the two countries. 
In January 2002,
shortly after their deten-
tion, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rums-
feld labeled the Guan-
tanamo Bay prisoners
“unlawful combatants”
who “do not have any
rights under the Geneva
Convention[s],” indicat-
ing that the prisoners would be treated “for the most part . . .
in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva
Conventions, to the extent they are appropriate.” In response
to this and similar statements, as well as footage of the
detainees incarcerated in metal cages and wearing shackles,
blacked-out goggles, surgical face masks, and sound-blocking
earmuffs, other governments and human rights groups have
condemned the U.S. for failing to respect human rights
and humanitarian law. Perhaps in acquiescence to this inter-
national pressure, the U.S. has modified its position on the
application of the Geneva Conventions, announcing in early
February that prisoners who fought for the Taliban in
Afghanistan would be covered by the Conventions. In spite
of U.S. efforts to allay international criticism, human rights
groups and international legal scholars continue to charge
that this latest decision fails to conform fully to the duties of
the U.S. under the Geneva Conventions. Specifically, while
the U.S. accurately acknowledged the general applicability
of the Conventions to Taliban detainees, the government’s
unilateral decision to deny all detainees prisoner of war
(POW) status, and its decision categorically to except al-Qaeda
detainees from any coverage by the Conventions, suggest the
U.S. government has improperly interpreted its legal oblig-
ations under the Conventions.
The Geneva Conventions and the Scope of Their Protection
There are four Geneva Conventions, signed in 1949 and
supplemented by two additional Protocols, signed in 1977. Con-
vention I, For the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, and Con-
vention II, For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Mem-
bers of Armed Forces at Sea,
enumerate protections guar-
anteed to members of the
armed forces who fall ill or are
injured during an armed con-
flict. Convention III, Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, and Convention IV,
Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of
War, describe protections guar-
anteed to persons who are
taken into enemy custody dur-
ing an armed conflict. Protocol
I, relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, and Protocol II, relat-
ing to the Protection of Vic-
tims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, extend pro-
tections of the Geneva Con-
ventions to persons combating
foreign occupation or inter-
nally racist regimes, as well as to victims of internal conflicts.
Most relevant to the Guantanamo Bay detainees are the
Third and Fourth Conventions. The Third Convention
defines categories of persons entitled to POW classification,
articulates the procedure for classifying a prisoner whose
status is unclear, and enumerates the rights of detainees
classified as POWs. Article 4 of the Third Convention defines
several categories of persons entitled to classification as pris-
oners of war, including persons “who have fallen into the
power of the enemy” and who are (1) members of armed
forces of a party to the conflict; or (2) members of other mili-
tias or volunteer corps, which are commanded by a person
responsible for subordinates; have a fixed and distinctive
symbol, recognizable at a distance; carry arms openly; and
conduct operations in accordance with the laws of war. Arti-
cle 5 explains that “[s]hould any doubt arise as to whether
persons, having committed a belligerent act and having
fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the cat-
egories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as
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their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”
The U.S. government is therefore obliged to recognize the
POW status of detainees who clearly fit into an Article 4 cat-
egory, and must allow a competent tribunal to determine the
status of those whose status is ambiguous.
Defining the Status of the Detainees
The U.S. government’s classification of the Guantanamo
Bay detainees as “unlawful combatants” has generated con-
fusion and controversy. Secretary Rumsfeld’s early state-
ment that all of the detainees were “unlawful combatants”
who lacked any rights under the Geneva Conventions seemed
to imply that “unlawful combatants” inherently are not pro-
tected by the Geneva Conventions. “Unlawful combatants,”
often referred to as “unprivileged combatants” are those
fighters who are not entitled to the privileges of POW status.
Unlawful combatants, however, are not persons lacking all
rights under the Conventions. Indeed, rather than suggest
that certain categories of aggressors may be excepted from
the protection of the Conventions, Article 4 of the Fourth
Convention professes a broad protection of persons “who,
at a given moment and in any man-
ner whatsoever, find themselves,
in case of a conflict or occupation,
in the hands of a Party to the con-
flict or Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals.” The only
caveat to this encompassing pro-
tection is that the prisoners must
be nationals of a state bound by the
Convention.
The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have interpreted the
Third and Fourth Conventions jointly to embrace all persons
who fall into enemy custody during an armed conflict, and
neither has recognized an exception for so-called unlawful
combatants. Quoting both sources, Human Rights Watch
(HRW) explained that “‘nobody in enemy hands can fall out-
side the law,’” and prisoners detained by an enemy in an
armed conflict either are protected by the Third Convention
as prisoners of war, or by the Fourth Convention as civilians.
The United States’ Application of the Geneva Conventions
After initially refusing to guarantee full application of the
Geneva Conventions to any of the detainees, the U.S. has
recently compromised, and conceded that the Conventions
apply to Taliban detainees. Nevertheless, the U.S. continues
to deny the application of the Geneva Conventions to al-
Qaeda prisoners, has refused to grant any of the detainees
POW status, and has denied the prisoners the right to a
determination of such status by a competent tribunal. The
U.S. government’s basis for distinguishing between Taliban
and al-Qaeda detainees was its recognition of Afghanistan’s
status as a signatory to the Conventions in contrast to al-Qaeda,
which, as a non-state actor, has not and could not have
signed the treaties. Such a categorical exception of al-Qaeda
detainees results from a flawed interpretation of the express
language of Article 4 of the Fourth Convention, and con-
tradicts customary interpretations of the broad scope of the
Conventions. Similarly, the executive decision categorically
to deny all detainees POW status directly violates Article 5 of
the Third Convention, which provides for the determination
of such status by competent tribunals. 
Refusal of the U.S. Government to Apply the Geneva Conventions
to al-Qaeda Detainees
In early February, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleis-
cher commented that al-Qaeda fighters “do not qualify [for
protection under the Geneva Conventions] because they
do not represent any country that is party to the treaty.” Arti-
cle 4 of the Fourth Convention does not except combatants
on the basis of their representation of a state not party to the
Conventions, but rather it excludes persons who are nation-
als of a state not bound by the Conventions. Thus, the lan-
guage of the Conventions seems to indicate that persons who
fought on behalf of al-Qaeda, and who are nationals of a state
party to the Conventions, would be within the scope of their
protections. 
According to HRW, the detainees encompass a variety of
nationalities, including Afghans, Pakistanis, and, in lesser
numbers, Saudis, Yemenis, Uzbeks, Chechens from Russia, Chi-
nese, and others. Each of these
nations has both signed and ratified
the Conventions, or joined the Con-
ventions by accession. The United
States ratified the Conventions in
1955. Although China, Pakistan,
the Russian Federation, Yemen,
and the U.S. entered reservations
and/or declarations upon signing
the Conventions, none of the reser-
vations or declarations provides a
basis for excluding their nationals from the general protections
afforded by the Conventions, or from the benefits of POW sta-
tus in particular. In addition, these reservations and declara-
tions do not provide a basis for denying such protections. Thus,
the U.S. government’s current policy of categorically refusing
to apply the Geneva Conventions to non-Taliban detainees con-
tradicts customary legal interpretations of the scope of the Con-
ventions, as well as the explicit language of the Fourth Con-
vention. Members of either the Taliban or al-Qaeda, who are
nationals of a country that has signed the Geneva Conventions,
expressly are within the scope of the treaties. Current U.S. pol-
icy at best misinterprets, and at worst ignores, this legal real-
ity and potentially renders the U.S. in breach of its treaty
obligations for any actions against detainees which contradict
the Conventions’ guarantees.
Denying All Detainees Prisoner of War Status
Although the U.S. has correctly recognized that the Geneva
Conventions apply to Taliban fighters captured during the pre-
sent conflict in Afghanistan, its unilateral decision to deny such
detainees POW status violates the procedures established by
the Conventions for determining the status of prisoners
captured by an enemy in an armed conflict. Moreover, the
refusal of the U.S. even to recognize the Geneva Conven-
tions with respect to al-Qaeda detainees precludes a proper
determination of their legal status. 
continued on next page
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Article 4 of the Third Convention confers POW status on
persons who fall into enemy power and who are members of
armed forces of a party to the conflict. Alternatively, Article
4 characterizes as POWs members of irregular forces, such as
militias or volunteer corps who: (1) adhere to an established
chain of command; (2) wear a uniform or otherwise have some
fixed and distinctive symbol, which is recognizable at a distance;
(3) carry arms openly; and (4) conduct operations in accor-
dance with the laws of war.
The Crimes of War Project, a collaborative organization of
journalists, lawyers, and scholars formed in 1999 and head-
quartered at American University in Washington, D.C., seeks
to educate the public about inter-
national humanitarian legal issues.
The Project recently surveyed inter-
national legal and humanitarian
experts on their opinions about the
applicability of the Geneva Con-
ventions to the Guantanamo Bay
detainees. Most of the survey’s
respondents believed Taliban
detainees, and possibly al-Qaeda
detainees, should be accorded POW
status. Most of the experts charac-
terized the Taliban detainees as
members of Afghanistan’s armed
forces, entitling them to POW status
under Article 4(1) of the Third Convention. Among such
experts, Washington College of Law Professor Robert Gold-
man criticized the Bush Administration’s classification of the
Taliban as irregular forces under Article 4(2), which requires
them to meet the four criteria enumerated under that cate-
gory. Similarly, during a recent interview on National Public
Radio, David Scheffer, Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of
Peace, emphasized the importance of recognizing that cap-
tured Taliban fighters are part of the organized, armed force
of Afghanistan, and thus entitled to POW status. Nevertheless,
even under the four criteria enumerated for irregular forces,
most of the experts surveyed by the Crimes of War Project
believed that the Taliban detainees would be entitled to POW
status. Curtis Doebbler, Professor of Human Rights Law at the
American University in Cairo, asserted that the Taliban do meet
the four criteria mandated for irregular forces, although he,
like many others, was less confident about the ability of al-Qaeda
detainees to satisfy the criteria. 
Indeed, there is less support for classifying al-Qaeda fight-
ers as POWs under the Geneva Conventions. Even HRW
has suggested that “ultimately the al-Qaeda fighters would
likely not be accorded POW status.” However, as HRW, the
Crimes of War Project, and other experts have highlighted,
the principal criticism of the U.S. position is not the gov-
ernment’s improper categorization of the detainees under
Article 4 of the Third Convention. Rather, critics emphasize
the government’s failure to make individualized determi-
nations about the status of each prisoner, and its outright
neglect of Article 5, which requires that a competent tribunal
resolve such controversial determinations. Article 5 further
provides that detainees whose legal status is in doubt “shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention” until a tri-
bunal makes the final determination. Thus, even if, as the U.S.
presently claims, none of the detainees ultimately would be
entitled to POW status, Article 5 requires that each detainee
whose status is in doubt be treated as a POW until a com-
petent tribunal makes a final determination. 
Under U.S. military regulations, a “competent tribunal”
pursuant to Article 5 of the Third Convention consists of
three commissioned officers. As HRW explained, the regu-
lations require that persons whose status is to be determined
be advised of their rights; be permitted to attend all open ses-
sions, call witnesses, question witnesses called by the tri-
bunal; be permitted, but not compelled, to testify or other-
wise address the tribunal; and be provided with an
interpreter, if necessary. The regulations provide for the
tribunal’s determination of the detainee’s status in closed ses-
sion by a majority vote and require
a preponderance of evidence to
support the tribunal’s finding.
The clear purpose of Article 5,
and the corresponding proce-
dures set forth in U.S. military
law, is to ensure that the assess-
ment of a prisoner’s status is a fair
and objective determination.
Beyond violating its explicit, legal
obligations under Article 5, the
executive branch’s unilateral
determination of the prisoners’
collective status, absent a finding
by an objective tribunal, renders
the U.S. susceptible to charges of unfairness, corruption, and
dishonesty.  
The Significance of Recognizing the Geneva Conventions 
The Geneva Conventions confer a variety of protections
to prisoners detained during an international conflict.
Among them are protections relating to humane treatment
(Convention III, Article 3; Convention IV, Article 3), inter-
rogation (Convention III, Article 17; Convention IV, Article
31), and prosecution (Convention III, Articles 87, 99-108;
Convention IV, Articles 146-47). The legal status of individ-
ual prisoners dictates the scope of their protections under
the Conventions. Nevertheless, all persons detained in an
armed conflict may be prosecuted for war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and other crimes unrelated to armed con-
flict. Similarly, all detainees must be treated humanely, in
accordance with international human rights norms, and as
recommended by the ICRC. 
Humane Treatment in the Context of International 
Human Rights Law
To provide a context for the Conventions’ requirement of
“humane treatment,” HRW explained that torture and ill-
treatment of prisoners are prohibited by customary law and
international human rights treaties. Article 7 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the
United States in 1992, sets forth the non-derogable principle
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Similarly,
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which the U.S.
became a party in 1994, prohibits, under all circumstances, the
continued on next page
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use of torture and other excessive forms of punishment. 
The Ramifications of POW Status: Humane Treatment and 
Interrogation 
Although all of the Guantanamo Bay detainees are enti-
tled to humane treatment under the broad provisions of the
Geneva Conventions and the more specific provisions of
international human rights treaties, those entitled to POW sta-
tus are guaranteed further protections. Regarding interro-
gation and prosecution, for example, the Third Convention
extends additional protections to POWs. Under Article 17,
POWs are required only to disclose their last names, first
names, rank, birth dates, and military serial numbers.
Although both POWs and unprivi-
leged combatants are protected by
the Conventions’ general prohibi-
tions against torture, Article 17 pro-
vides that POWs who refuse to
answer interrogations “may not be
threatened, insulted, or exposed to
unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.” Article 21
prohibits holding POWs in close
confinement except as necessary to safeguard their health, and
in such circumstances, the nature and duration of confine-
ment also must be limited to what is necessary. Similarly,
Article 25 requires that POWs be accommodated in conditions
as favorable as those provided for the forces of the detaining
power stationed in the same area. Such conditions must
allow for the habits and customs of the prisoners, and may not
be prejudicial to their health. Article 34 guarantees POWs
“complete latitude” in the enjoyment and exercise of their reli-
gious duties. Prisoners who are properly determined not to
be POWs are not entitled to these and other guarantees enu-
merated in the Third Convention.
In the absence of a proper determination of the status of
each detainee at Guantanamo Bay, and in light of the ICRC’s
inability to disclose its findings publicly, it is difficult to ana-
lyze whether any of the detainees are entitled to these specific
POW privileges, let alone whether their rights have been vio-
lated. Foreign governments and media, and international
human rights groups, have articulated a general concern
regarding the apparent nature of the prisoners’ detention.
Their critiques have suggested that depriving the detainees of
their senses of sight and hearing by requiring them to wear
blacked-out goggles and sound-blocking earmuffs constitutes
inhumane treatment, in violation of the general human rights
principles embodied in the Geneva Conventions.
The U.S. government has defended its detention practices
as necessary security measures. On January 18, 2002, delegates
of the ICRC visited the Guantanamo Bay detainees, but
ICRC standard procedures prohibit public comment on the
treatment or conditions of prisoners. Rather, ICRC delegates
submit recommendations to detaining authorities and
encourage such authorities to take measures necessary to
resolve any humanitarian problems.
The Ramifications of POW Status: Prosecution and Punishment
Perhaps the most significant rights accorded to prisoners
of war are in the context of prosecution and punishment.
Generally speaking, POWs may not be prosecuted or pun-
ished for mere participation in the armed conflict, although
they may be tried for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and crimes unrelated to the conflict. Article 83 of the Third
Convention requires that a detaining power exercise “the
greatest leniency” in determining whether an offense alleged
to have been committed by a POW be adjudged by judicial
or disciplinary proceedings and provides that “wherever
possible, disciplinary rather than judicial measures” shall
be taken. Article 84 enunciates that “[i]n no circumstances
whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind
which does not offer the essential guarantees of indepen-
dence and impartiality as generally recognized, and in par-
ticular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused
the rights and means of defence
provided for in Article 105.” Arti-
cle 105 correspondingly guaran-
tees POWs the assistance of a legal
defense by a qualified advocate
or counsel of his choice. It fur-
ther requires that the detaining
power deliver to the protecting
power a list of persons qualified to
present the POW’s defense, and
ultimately obliges the detaining
power to appoint a competent advocate or counsel if the
POW does not choose his own. Article 86 guarantees POWs
the right against double jeopardy. Article 87 limits the penal-
ties to which POWs may be subjected to those that would be
imposed upon members of the armed forces of the detain-
ing power who have committed the same acts. Article 106 pro-
vides that every POW shall have the same rights of appeal or
petition of a sentence as are guaranteed to the members of
the armed forces of the detaining power. Moreover, POWs
must be fully informed of such rights, as well as the time limit
within which they may appeal. 
In light of these and the numerous other rights guaran-
teed to prisoners of war, it is clear that the Guantanamo Bay
detainees are not being treated in accordance with the Third
Convention. Moreover, absent an objective determination of
their legal status by a competent tribunal, the nature of
their detention violates the requirement in Article 5 that
detainees whose status is uncertain be treated in accordance
with the Third Convention until such status is determined.
The Consequences of Selectively Applying the Geneva 
Conventions 
Beyond noting the sheer illegality of selectively applying
the Geneva Conventions, some experts question why the
U.S. would violate its duties in the absence of any apparent
gain. Most of the experts surveyed by the Crimes of War Pro-
ject believe that the U.S. has little to gain from denying
POW status to qualified prisoners. Such experts noted that
POWs and unprivileged combatants are equally subject to
prosecution for fundamental human rights violations. Per-
haps the government’s primary concern is the apparent
conflict between its noted intention to try those detained in
military tribunals, where procedural rights are limited and
the rules of evidence are more indulgent, and the provisions
in the Third Convention requiring that POWs be prose-
In light of these and the numerous other
rights guaranteed to prisoners of war, it is
clear that the Guantanamo Bay detainees
are not being treated in accordance with
the Third Convention.
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cuted and punished in a manner consistent with the treat-
ment of members of the armed forces of the detaining coun-
try who violate similar laws. 
Regardless of the government’s underlying objectives,
setting a standard for selectively applying the provisions of
an international treaty poses serious consequences to citizens
of all states parties to the agreement. In particular, some have
expressed concern over the future treatment of U.S. special
forces, who usually do not wear uniforms and therefore
could be denied POW status for failing to meet the condi-
tions enumerated in Article (4)(2) of the Third Convention.
Conclusion
The Geneva Conventions set forth legal standards and pro-
cedures for the treatment of all nationals of states parties who
fall into enemy custody during an armed conflict. In par-
ticular, the Third Convention articulates a duty of a detain-
ing power to convene a competent tribunal to determine the
legal status of persons detained in such a conflict. Moreover,
where the status of detainees is in doubt, a detaining power
is required to accord them the rights and privileges
enumerated in the Third Convention until such status is
determined by an objective tribunal. The circumstances of
the detention and treatment by the United States of the
prisoners currently detained at Guantanamo Bay fail to
conform to the Geneva Conventions in several respects. The
refusal to recognize the Conventions with respect to prisoners
classified as members of al-Qaeda violates the text and
customary interpretations of the Fourth Convention. The
unilateral determination that no prisoner is entitled to POW
status violates the Third Convention’s guarantee that such
determinations are to be made by competent tribunals.
Finally, in light of the likelihood that at least some of the pris-
oners should be entitled to POW status, the nature of their
detention violates the various provisions of the Third Con-
vention, which guarantee privileged treatment to POWs.
As one of the most powerful nations in the world, the U.S.
is setting a dangerous precedent for the future application
and interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. In the inter-
est of its own credibility, as well as the future safety of its own
armed forces, the U.S. government would be well advised to
reconsider its position and comply with all of its obligations
under the Conventions. 
* Erin Chlopak is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
with the gravest concern the practice of forced gynaecolog-
ical examinations of women in the investigation of allegations
of sexual assault, including of women prisoners while in
custody. The Committee emphasized that such coercive
practices were degrading, discriminatory and unsafe and
constituted a violation by state authorities of the bodily
integrity, person and dignity of women.” The Committee also
expressed concern about the categorization of violence
against women as a “crime against public decency and pub-
lic order,” and stated that such categorization contradicted
the spirit of CEDAW. Further, the Committee noted its deep
concern that greater penalties were imposed for the rape of
a woman who was a virgin.
Although Turkey has taken initial steps in meeting its
obligations under CEDAW by abolishing certain discrimi-
natory laws, Turkey remains obligated to eliminate all dis-
criminatory customs and practices, and take all measures nec-
essary to end discrimination against women. CEDAW requires
parties not only to refrain from discriminating against
women, but also to ensure compliance by authorities and
institutions, and to take all necessary measures against any
person, organization, or enterprise that engages in dis-
criminatory practices. The recent decree banning virginity
testing will be insufficient if sanctions are not levied against
those who violate the decree. 
Conclusion 
Turkey’s human rights record has been cited consistently
as grounds for denying Turkey admission into the European
Union. Repealing the virginity testing law is a step in the
right direction, but more needs to be done to eradicate the
practice. The government must initiate a nationwide campaign
to inform women that the practice has been banned and that
they have the right to refuse to comply with virginity testing.
Further, doctors must be notified regarding the new law. To
fully comply with international human rights standards, Turkey
should adhere to the following measures, as recommended by
HRW: stop detaining women for illegal prostitution without
objective evidence; prohibit police from forcing women sus-
pected of prostitution to undergo gynecological exams with-
out their consent; stop discriminating against women by hold-
ing them to subjective standards of modesty to which men are
not held; publicly denounce the forced imposition of virgin-
ity exams under any circumstances as a grave and intolerable
human rights abuse and a violation of domestic and interna-
tional law; direct state-employed doctors not to perform vir-
ginity exams on girls and women; train law enforcement per-
sonnel, health care providers, public officials, and others
involved in the custody, interrogation, and treatment of
detainees that compulsory virginity exams are prohibited,
and will result in punishment; and examine rape victims only
with their informed consent, the authorization of a prosecu-
tor or judge, and only for the purpose of gathering forensic
evidence.
Turkey’s actions in the near future will indicate whether
officially banning virginity testing constitutes a real com-
mitment to eradicating this egregious practice or an empty
promise designed to improve its reputation. To meet its
obligations under international law and truly improve its
standing in the international community, Turkey must
demonstrate respect for women’s human rights not just on
paper, but in practice. 
* Chanté Lasco is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief.
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